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"The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who made that decision were unaware
of the recent history of problems concerning the O-rings and the joint and were unaware of the
initial written recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at temperatures below
53 degrees Fahrenheit and the continuing opposition of the engineers at Thiokol after the
management reversed its position. They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's
concern that it was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad. If the decision makers had
known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have decided to launch 5l -L on
January28, 1986." (l)
The above passagge is a statement made by the Presidential Commission who did
investigative work on the space shuttle Challenger. I think many of us remember that
day, January 28,1986 watching the launching on television. I know I do, I was around
eight years old at the time.
Many different corporations played key roles in the Challenger launching and
aftermath. NASA wasn't the only company affected. Morton Thiokol, the company who
made the solid rocket boosters, was a major player, nhd was affected financially as well
as also threatened by their business performance. To further understand the whole
process, we need to identifu the issues and their providers. The roles of many people
were important in dealing with the crash, such as the executives, astronauts and their
families, along with the public opinions. This accident did have a slight impact on our
economy, this issue also had to be dealt with.
To understand these complex issues requires stepping back to late 1985, when
NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration was preparing for yet another
mission. This mission would include the use of the space shuttle Challenger 5l -L,
scheduled for a December 1985 launch. The Challenger very much resembled ajet
airliner. Its wide body was one hundred and twenty-two feet long with seventy-five feet
wingspan. Most of the vehicle could be recycled, lowering costs. The entire shuttle could
be reused so costs of fueling,launching, and routine maintenance would be reduced. (2)
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The purpose of the space shuttle was to provide the United States with cheaper
access to space then using expandable rockets. Morton Thiokol Inc., located in Utah,
received the contract to make the rockets for NASA.
Beginning in 1973, starting the shuttle program was difficult for NASA. Funds
for research, development and operation were cut early in the program. A few times the
shuttle program was going to be canceled. Although many parts of the shuttle were able
to be reusable, conflicts arose, such as a system in one section wouldn't work well with
another so costly rework would have to be done. Cutting corners in the shuttle program
is a good example of how in the end, much higher costs were required. If the good
funding could have been given in the beginning, a more dependable, reusable space
shuttle would have been built.
The 1985 Challenger flight was the first mission with two civilians on board. The
first civilian, Greg Janis, helped with building the satellite and the second was the winner
of the Teacher in Space Program Christa McAuliffe, a teacher from Concord New
Hampshire.
The mission of this trip included the launching of a satellite and observe Halley's
comet pass through our galaxy. The satellite to be launched on the first day of the
mission was called the TDRS-2 or Tracking Data and Relay Satellite. TDRS-2 would
allow NASA to track and communicate with other in-flight shuttles and orbiting
spacecrafts. The TDRS-I was already in orbit and the two satellites would work together
to communicate better in space. TDRS-2 satellite would go into orbit by rocket powered
engines and allow it to travel along with earth's rotation. Although the satellite would be
orbiting, it would appear to be stationary hovering over Hawaii. (3)
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On the third day of the mission the crew was to take pictures of Halley's comet on
its seventy-five year orbit. The Spartan Halley Observatory, a photographic telescope,
would take the pictures. The crew would focus on the pictures of the ultraviolet light
from Halley's comet. On the fifth day of the mission the observatory would be retrieved
from orbit by using a fifty-foot mechanical arm.
The Teacher in Space Program winner was Sharon Christa McAuliffe, also known
as Christa McAuliffe, who was one of the seven crewmembers chosen to join the NASA
mission The Challenger 5l-L in 1985. For Christa McAuliffe, the process started in the
fall of 1984 when President Reagan decided to give a tribute to the teaching profession by
sending a teacher into space.
InNovember of 1984, NASA distributed an'Announcement of Opportunity'
across the states and into the US territories. This was an opportunity to send the first
civilian into space. According to the announcement, only one teacher would be chosen to
go on the mission. (4) Over 10,000 applications were returned to NASA and from there
NASA narrowed it down to two per state and territory for a total of one hundred and
fourteen people. These candidates ranged from former astronauts to pro basketball
players to college presidents and administrators. All one hundred and fourteen
candidates, including Christa McAuliffe, were interviewed by nineteen different staff
members. Along with the interviews, medical exzuns, and physical and psychological
fitness tests were administered. The candidates had to be briefed about space flight by
going through chamber simulated conditions. Finally, after all the testing the nominees
had to return to Washington D.C. for a final interview. On July 19, 1985 the committee
chose Christa McAuliffe to go on the shuttle Challenger mission in December of 1985.
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(5) When she received the award, and was granted to join the mission of the Challenger,
in the White House she stated, "It is not often that a teacher is at a loss for words, I know
my students wouldn't think so. I've made nine wonderful friends over the last two
weeks. When that shuttle goes, there might be one body, but there's going to be ten souls
I'm taking with me." (6)
McAuliffe was a high school teacher, specializing in American history and social
studies, believed that students learn about historic or current events best when challenged
to experience life for themselves. She took one year off of teaching to focus on the
training of the mission but planned to return to her school after the mission. During
training, McAuliffe tried hard not to be a burden for the other crewmembers because of
her lack of experience. "Throughout her training, Christa McAuliffe remained a teacher
first. She called herself a space flight participant, not an astronaut." (7) With constant
interviewing by the media, Christa used her role as NASA's link to the public very
responsibly by sharing experiences and observations in ways that would benefit the space
program.
Along with McAuliffe, six other members of the Challenger crew both male and
female began preparing for the great journey ahead. The Mission commander of the
Challenger was Francis R. (Dick) Scobee, who was responsible for seeing all mission
assignments carried out according to plan. Scobee would also maintain constant
communication with mission control in Houston Texas. The pilot of the Challenger was
Mike Smith. His job was to guide the Challenger out of orbit with the Earth and land the
shuttle in Edwards Airforce Base in the Southern California Desert. One of the first black
men in space was to be Ron McNair, who was going to observe Halley's comet and
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interpret the photographs taken by the observatory. Along with one of the first black men
in space, the first Japanese-American Ellison Onizuka from Hawaii was going to go in
the shuttle Chollenger and be in charge of deploying the satellite. Lastly, one of the first
civilians to go into space on a NASA mission was Greg Janis, who was the manager in
charge of designing the satellite that would be deployed to keep contact with other space
missions. (8) Judith Resnik joined Christa McAuliffe as the second woman aboard the
Challenger. Her job was to operate the remote manipulator arm to release and retrieve
the Spartan Halley Observatory. Resnik helped to perfect the design and operation of the
arm. (9)
On Monday January 27th,the mission was ready to begin. The seven
crewmembers were ready to launch, they got into the shuttle and were strapped in their
seats when a faulty bolt in the door was discovered. The countdown was stopped and the
crewmembers waited for four hours for the bolt to be fixed, but by then the winds were
too bad to take flight. The launch was postponed for the next day on January 28th.
According to Challenger: A Major Malfunction, this led to problems with
launching the shuttle. NASA personel had only a slight window for launching, if they
miss the days, they cannot launch for there are other missions to pursue. NASA was
launching about six missions a year. Especially during the winter months, the weather
plays a key role in the decision to launch. The shuttle will not work properly of the
weather is too cold. The worst launch ever recorded in NASA history was at 50 degrees
Fahrenheit in the solid rocket boosters. The O-rings are pressure seals between the
middle and lower sections of the solid rocket booster, if they get too cold, they will erode
and not form an airtight seal. (10)
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Mission consultants at the Morton Thiokol Plant in Utah heard of cold weather
moving into the Kennedy Space Center and unanimously recolnmended the launch not be
attempted for the next day. Being pushed for time, the Marshall Representatives at
Kennedy Space Center couldn't believe Morton Thiokol executives wanted to cancel the
launch, especially the director Witliam Lucas. They wouldn't accept the fact that the low
temperature might cause the O-rings to fail. "Marshal Representatives at NASA knew
that some initial erosion would occur, after this erosion, the O-rings would ultimately seal
intact. If the primary O-ring failed to seal the joint, Marshall executives researched that
the secondary O-ring would act as a back-up." (11) Marshall Representatives wanted
Morton Thiokol manager Allen MacDonald to reconsider thoughts on the launch and give
proof of how the crew- members would be harmed if the mission were carried out- Even
after proof of the back-up O-ring, Morton Thiokol still wouldn't approve of the launch,
NASA began to threaten future involvement with Morton Thiokol. As this meeting went
on all night, the crew of the Challenger had no idea of the arising conflicts. (12)
The launching disagreement created a conflict between companies. ln1973,
NASA decided to build a Space Shuttle both reusable and cost effective. Morton Thiokol
had the best bid, $800 million including the cost plus reward fees. The Morton Thiokol
Plant created the solid rocket booster project, and they had to work closely with NASA,
but if they didn't have equipment that could hold up to certain standards, NASA would
need to find a new company that would. It was debated for a length of time whether or
not to use solid or liquid rocket boosters, since it has always been liquid in the past.
"Liquids are preferable to solids because they can be restarted and are easier to control.
Once the liquid is ignited, it will burn until it is empty, in case of a problem, it cannot be
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turned off. Solids have always been considered too dangerous because of capacity on the
spacecraft. For solid rocket boosters, they had only been used in escape and retro-rocket
situations." (13) An article written by Kurt Hoover and Wallace T. Fowler suggests that,
"after much internal debate withinNASA, a cost and politics driven decision was made to
use solid rockets despite their inherent dangers." (14) "The statistics of the solids are one
in fifty failed uses." (15)
By analyzing many readings, the solid rocket boosters are constructed in sections
and stacked on top of each other to form the completed booster rocket. Four fuel sections
are stacked on top of the nozzle and topped by the nose cap. Before the Challenger, each
intersection was connected by a field joint held with 77 steel pins, and sealed by an O-
ring joint made of synthetic rubber to protect it from the internal combustion products
and high temperatures. The boosters had an internal layer of putty which helped in the
sealing of the O-ring joints. (16)
Even in lg/3,the solid rocket boosters had several problems, but "costs to correct
did not negate the Morton Thiokol cost advantage." (17) Meaning that the price Morton
Thiokol charges is so low that it is easier to deal with the problems and try to fix them
then to get a new company. Both Morton Thiokol and NASA documented problems with
O-ring design, "despite consistent evidence of the hazardous nature halted to correct the
anomalies. ..with the fourth test flight NASA declared space shuttle operational!" (18)
Beginning with the tenth mission of the shuttle in January 1984 and concluding with the
twenty-f,rfth, Challenger flight more than half the missions experienced O-ring problems.
By 1985, the O-ring erosion problem had been well documented at Marshall and Morton-
Thiokol, yet the management of both organizations ignored concerns and labeled the
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problem an ooacceptable risk" rather than suspending shuttle missions until the problem
was fixed. NASA administrators reported that they did not consider the problem
hazardous to mission safety. (19) NASA and Morton Thiokol kept having successful
missions with no explosions so they kept launching and taking risks.
In the middle of the night on January 28,1985 a meeting was held between
Morton Thiokol, Marshal Representatives, and NASA officials. The meeting was about
the O-rings, and whether or not the launch should take place. Morton Thiokol's Vice
President Jerold Mason stepped in and was concemed with the future business with the
Marshall Representatives at the space center. Roger Boisjoly, Morton Thiokol's engineer
in charge of the O-ring Seal Task Force who protested the launch said that he had never
had a safety person ask him about the workings of the solid rocket booster joint. No one
from Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance progfttm attended the meeting which
could have been crucial in the decision making process of whether or not to launch. They
identiff in-flight and post-flight problems. After a meeting the Vice President of Morton
Thiokol decided to ovemrle the recommendation given by manager MacDonald and
notified the space center of the approval to launch. MacDonald still refused to sign the
permission document, so the others went on without his signature.
The next morning, on Tuesday, January 28th the ice conditions were really bad.
The launch was moved from 9:38 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. Every hour or so the ice committee
would check the launch pad to see if melting had begun, by 8:30 a.m. all the ice was
gone. A meeting was held by the National Space Transportation System Director Arnold
Aldrich. During this meeting, Robert Glaysher, the Vice President of Orbiter Relations at
Rockwell thought the launch was unsafe. His primary concern was icicles hanging on the
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launchpad would fall and damage the heat tiles on the Challenger.
At l0:30 a.m. another inspection of ice was done and no ice was present. The left
solid rocket booster was at thirty degrees Fahrenheit and the right solid rocket booster
was at nineteen degrees Fahrenheit. At this point, the Mission Management team decided
to launch. At temperatures too cold, the shuttle at risk, and companies future with NASA
'on the line,' they decided to launch the Challenger.
At l0:35 a.m. on January 28th, the crew of the Challenger came ready to launch
into space. "One of the launch technicians handed Christa McAuliffe an apple. Smiling,
she handed it back to him and said, "save it until I get back." (20) Family members were
located in the VIP viewing grandstands, crews immediate family members viewed from
the roof of the launch control building. Even fifteen third graders from Concord, New
Hampshire were flown to Florida to be present for the viewing of their teacher flying into
space.
At 1 1:00 a.m. the Challenger began the launch. As soon as the rockets ignited, so
did the troubles. The first indication of a problem occurred as the shuttle was rising, a
large puff of gray smoke came from the right solid rocket booster. As the shuttle rose and
accelerated its vertical climb, more smoke came out of the same, but it turned darker and
darker. NASA's computer graphics analysis showed that the grease and O-rings were
being bumed and eroded by the hot propellant gases. (21) At this time, powerful winds
swept through and put alarge amount of force on the shuttle. Meanwhile the
crewmembers experiencing the intense acceleration of the flight didn't rcalize all this was
going on. They flew upward into the sky just as a flame appeared on the right solid
rocket booster in area of the field joints. This lowered the pressure of the right solid
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rocket booster, which meant that a leak was growing in the field joints. The flame now
was growing larger and began mixing with the leaking hydrogen.
It was at this point that the Challenger began to struggle. The right solid rocket
booster was breaking away from the external tank and being rotated around the upper
attachment crashing into the oxygen tank. "This was the beginning of the structural
failure of hydrogen tank that culminated in the entire aft dome dropping away. This
released massive amounts of liquid hydrogen from the tank and created a sudden forward
thrust of about 2.8 million pounds, pushing the hydrogen tank upward into the intertank
structure." (22)
For the Challenger a massive explosion occurred with burning of hydrogen and
oxygen engulfing the shuttle into an explosive burn. "The Challenger 's reaction control
system ruptured and a hyperbolic bum of its propellants occurred as it excited the
oxygen-hydrogen flames. The orbiter, under severe aerodynamic loads, broke into
several large sections which emerged from the fireball." (23)
The sequence of events did not immediately kill the crew, as autopsies later
revealed. No one died from the explosion. The crew compartment was found over a
month later, the bodies of the crew were still seat-belted in their chairs. "Pathologists
worked for weeks to establish the cause of death, findings were inconclusive. It is known
that the forces of the breakup were not violent enough to cause death or even
unconsciousness." (24) Three ofthe four personal egress air packs had been recovered
and activated with two-thirds of the air exhausted. "This evidence would suggest that the
crew survived the momentary high G-force load of the explosion and were aware of their
fate. But the impact of the crew compartment with the water imposed forces excess two-
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hundred G's, far beyond the level of survivability." (25)
Recovery crews found several tons of debris on the first day. With this material
NASA has tried to reassemble the collected remains into a skeletal model of the
Challenger. Some parts of the shuttle were unharmed, whereas some were badly burned.
Jim Devlin, who was in charge of the Liberty crew, the ship collecting the debris, reports
that "the crew of the Liberty worked with grim professionalism, not allowing their
emotions free reign until they found a section of side fuselage bearing the American flag.
Then they shed their first tears." (26)
President Reagan immediately addressed the nation to help the people deal with
the tragedy. His main focus was to console the children, those who watched the tragedy
on television all over the country. Three days later, President Reagan in a national
broadcast honored the heroes at the Johnson Space Center in Houston Texas. "After the
President spoke, the band played 'God Bless America' and the NASA T-38 jets
thundered overhead in the traditional 'missing man' formation that symbolized the loss of
apilot." (27)
Many services followed the one held in Houston, including a memorial in Florida
at the Kennedy Space Center. Christa McAuliffe was remembered at three additional
services. One was at her elementary school where she taught, another at her college of
Framingham State held a memorial service attended by one-thousand people, and a third
private service for her family and close friends. (28)
A nationwide flag-raising ceremony was coordinated by the Kentucky
Department of Education on February 4th at 11:39, exactly one week later. Education
sites in over thirty different states raised 'leaming and liberty,' a special flag to
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cornmemorate the importance of public education. (29)
Following the accident, President Reagan created a special Commission to
investigate the Challenger accident. It sought to discover exactly what went wrong, who
was involved, and take steps to further determine the future of NASA space flight.
Throughout the investigation the presidential committee found much displeasure with the
agency's internal review of what caused the explosion. "Commission members weren't
satisfied with NASA tests showing the seals on the rocket boosters on the shuttle weren't
affected by temperatures as low as minus-l0 degrees Fahrenheit." (30) Commission
members also wanted NASA to run more detailed tests and to run simulations of the
actual liftoff conditions to be more accurate. "The commission even asked NASA to hire
an outside observer to watch-over the tests to make sure they are accurate." (31)
From researching an article in the Administrative Science Quarterly, it is easy to
see that the presidential commission found three problem-reporting requirement failures.
First, the Safety, Requirements, and Quality Assurance program (SR&QA) did not
establish and maintain clear and sufficient requirements for reporting shuttle problems up
the NASA hierarchy. "In 1983, the director of SR&QA at Johnson Space Center reduced
the requirements for reporting problems, resulting in less documentation and fewer
reporting requirements that all safety problems be reported to upper levels." (32) Second,
the commission found that SR&QA had failed to create a concise set of requirements for
reporting in-flight anomalies (unexpected events or unexplained departures from past
mission experience. Often times with this situation, scattered individual documents often
contradicted each other. Finally, SR&QA failed to detect violations of problem reporting
requirements. NASA's level III project managers were required to inform Level II of
Brawand, l3
launch constraints. A launch constraint is issued by Level II managers in response to a
serious safety issue. Corrective actions need to be taken before the shuttle can even
launch. With the extensiveness of O-ring erosion found after the shuttle launch of April
in 1985, Level III managers placed a launch constraint against six shuttle flights. (33)
Intense investigation began also with an examination of the shuttle. Many
different theories concluded from the investigations mostly dealing with the O-ring
failure but some with the smoke and flames from the rockets. An engineer at NASA
believed, "a flawed joint seal was not the sole cause of the explosion and thought that
pieces of struts holding the bottom of the right booster to the extemal fuel tank and
related hardware broke away from the craft about 55 seconds after liftoff." (34) Those
struts, investigated by the presidential commission, were under extraordinary stress.
NASA also found unusual smoke at liftoff. "'When the two solid-fuel rocket boosters
were ignited at liftoff the smoke appeared to last about 1.4 seconds." (35) It emerged
several feet from the nearest joint in the rocket booster. Engineers haven't been satisfied
with their performance. Documents released by NASA showed that the agency waved a
"fail safe" requirement for the joints even though tests indicated failure of a main seal
could be catastrophic.
NASA engineers were speculating that the low temperatures may have been
caused by a pinhole leak in the shuttles huge external fuel tank; such a leak would have
allowed a jet of supercold fuel to spurt onto the booster, perhaps freezing a joint. The
joint then could have failed when exposed to the tremendous heat inside the booster
during liftoff.
"NASA now attributes the disaster to what many officials had long speculated:
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the failure of a seal joining two sections of the Challenger 's right booster rocket. Such a
failure would have allowed superheated gases to bum a hole into, and eventually ignite,
the shuttle's massive exterior fuel tank." (36) Tests have ruled out structural defects in
the Challenger's fuel tanks, damage from flying debris and load stresses.
An article by the Wall Street Journal summarizes a chain of events entitled
"scenario Six" which is a theory created by Marshall Reps. that outlines the accident.
"According to this theory, cold temperatures may have stiffened or slightly frozen the
putty used in the rocket joint, preventing the seal from pressurizing and therefore closing
poorly." (37) The putty is supposed to flex slightly at ignition, forcing the rocket seals or
O-rings, to close the joint from the hot temperatures of the buming propellant inside. The
putty though, is temperature sensitive. The putty is supposed to hold pressure off the O-
rings at lower temperatures and for longer periods of time. The freezing temperatures
caused the putty to stiffen, which may have delayed or prevented the O-ring from
pressuring the moving into its proper place. In the event of this, the hot gases could have
gone through the joint like it wasn't even there. Later tests showed that at a temperature
of 30 degrees F the putty appeared to hold the pressure off the O-ring for 10 seconds,
which was very significant. (38) But the performance at lower temperatures was unclear.
The temperatures on the day of the launch were 24 degrees at dawn and rose to 38
degrees at liftoff. The putty wasn't discussed during a two-hour telephone conference the
night before the launch between NASA and Morton Thiokol. Any apprehension about
the putty's performance apparently was forgotten in the debate over how cold weather
would affect the O-rings. "Quite frankly, we didn't think the putty was an issue." A
Thiokol engineer said. "It might have been an oversight on our part." (39)
Brawand, l5
Space agency officials are finding that the putty's failure could have been
exacerbated by the natural expansion of the joint during liftoff, which may have caused
the failure of a backup seal. "The putty may help in the investigation of the smoke
spewing from the rocket at liftoff, indicating a bad seal, how was the Challenger able to
fly for 73 seconds before exploding? With a bad seal, the shuttle should have exploded
after only l0 to 20 seconds." (40)
Investigators are finding that the putty could have formed a temporary protective
seal over the damaged joint, allowing the Challenger to fly for slightly more than a
minute before the explosion. From all the research the seal failure could have been any
number of conditions. Remember the delay in the failure of a backup seal closing off the
main seal and stiffening of the putty could be main failures. The presence of ice in the
joint that might have forced the seal out of place; or a breach of the main ring due to a
number of environmental factors, like cold and humidity. Many believed though that the
O-ring would form its function. Rocket seals in the past had held up in the past flights.
Some erosion, or chipping, was shown on only six of the 171 main seals used between
the rocket segments and none on the backup seals. Sixteen of the 57 main seals used
between the bottom of the rocket and the exhaust nozzle showed some erosion, as did one
backup seal. (41)
The National Science Foundation has written critical reports about the joints and
claim that following the accident no backup joint had been created and the assembly of
the bad joint remains being made, even without regard to the consequences of the
Challenger. They claim that they are still in a developmental progftIm, despite that it has
been occurring since 1982 or so, and with new designed joints they won't know until the
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full-duration tests are done if they will be successful. The redesign of the joint is less
reliable on paper than the original design was. Morton Thiokol and NASA are betting
that with successful test programs will veriff that the poorly redesigned joint is
acceptable for flight certification. Both companies believed this before the Challenger
accident, and the consequences were honible. The joint used before and on the
Challenger had nine test firings and24 actual flights before the bad design produced a
failure, the Challenger. Before beginning a developmental design program with the bad
joints, NASA and Morton Thiokol need to recognize the consequences and start from the
beginning with a whole new idea.
As a result of this unfortunate accident, many important people from all
companies took early retirement or simply left the companies. Jesse Moore, who was in
charge of the space shuttle program at the time of the Challenger accident, resigned from
NASA. He was the associate administrator for space flight and gave the "OKAY" for the
launching of the Challenger. Although a few months after the accident, Moore became
the head of Johnson Space Center in Houston, which he left in October of 1984 to
become NASA's special assistant to the General Manager. Moore has said that he wasn't
informed of the recurring problems with the shuttle's booster rockets, and was also
unaware of the engineers at Morton Thiokol who urged a delay in the launch until the
weather changed.
With NASA at the Johnson Space Center, JSC, since the reporting system is
carried out similar to the game called 'telephone.' NASA modified the number of people
needing to be reported to in case of a conflict. In October of 1986 a new JSC Center
Director was appointed. The Center Director is the highest position to be reported to,
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they carry out the action. In the past, the Flight Crew Operational Director reported to the
Director of Space Operations who then reported to the Center Director. As a result of the
Challenger tragedy, the Director of Flight Crew Operations Division now immediately
reports to the Center Director. (42) Marshall Space Flight Center Director Dr. William
Lucas retired in the following July. Morton Thiokol Vice-president Gerald Mason, of
Wasatch Division plant outside Brigham City, Utah was moved to oversee the facilities
two other operations, strategic and tactic missiles. Mason was to focus on the two
money-making businesses unaffected by the shuttle disaster. One spokesman said about
Mason, "If all management's concems are on the business in crisis, than those businesses
not in crisis will be there because of mismanagement." (43) Responsibility for the space
division was given to Edward G. Dorsey Jr., who had retired from the company in 1984
but returned as Vice-president to the general manager. Dorsey was very respected at
Thiokol and will head the task force for completing the investigation and new
engineering designs and qualification tests for future rockets. Calvin Wiggins, another
four year senior executive, decided to clear the launch will become Mr. Dorsey's deputy,
Wiggins previously held the post Dorsey will assume. Lawrence Mulloy, the director of
solid rocket booster project left the company. Responsibilities weren't changed for
Joseph Kilminster and Robert Lund, the two other space division executives who agreed
to launch the day before the accident.
As for the families of the lost crewmembers, most of them just slowly moved on
with their lives. Many have established scholarships in their nuunes, and learning groups
about space shuttle education in their memory. Only two of the seven families sued
NASA and Morton Thiokol after all investigations were completed. Since the research
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dates back to 1986, the only information that was given on the cases were that the
families won their filed lawsuits.
The New York Times wrote an extensive article on the remains of the space
shuttle Challenger and the burial process. All remains were to be buried in an abandoned
missile silo adjacent to Cape Canaveral Florida. Lawyers had to delay the burial because
as of December in 1986 many of the claims were not yet completed. Thankfully no news
organizations were allowed to view the shuttles badly damaged crew compartment or
obtain pictures of it. "The crew cab investigation creates problems because it is where
seven people died and raises privacy concems with the astronauts' families." (44) With
this incident, news reporters would find out less information about the shuttle then they
would about an airplane crash.
A major turning point for NASA was dealing with the press throughout this whole
accident process. Since the launch was broadcasted on television, the nation knew before
NASA could plan a public relations strategy. The networks were coming up with their
own ideas even before NASA could analyze it. The agency was not very quick with a
response to the accident. Everyone was sort of in a trance from the explosion that the
agency's form of handling the explosion turned into a major human and technological
loss into a public relations fiasco that could have seriously damaged the agency's prestige
and credibility. "In the past NASA has had audio broadcasts from space flights since the
early 60's, but it has a 60 second delay in the tape so that if any catastrophe were to
happen it would never be broadcasted live." (45) Challenger launch, by contrast, was
live because Teacher in Space winner Christa McAuliffe was to teach live broadcast
lessons to gain public support for the space program into thousands of American
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classrooms.
NASA has needed the media since it began in 1958. Any friction with the media
had a negative effect on NASA. Image-conscious officials manage the flow of
information to avoid any risks and try to receive the public and political support. When a
shuttle mission, or any mission is successful, that keeps the public interest alive and
supports future funding requests. NASA even helps sympathetic politicians with
aggressive campaigning. With the Challenger disaster, the agency kept a tight lid on
engineering and quality control records, which forced dozens of reporters to seek other
sogrces of information. Some people from the agency did leak out information to
reporters, however which damaged NASA. The truth is that NASA's communication
faults cost it political support. Only successful launches will restore public confidence.
"NASA has taken lots of careful steps in protectingthe Challenger explosion, but with
their handling of the crisis, it has done little to repair the damage." (46)
On February 11, 1986 a poll was taken by the Wall Street Joumal and NBC to
find the response of the public opinion on NASA. Out of 1,597 adults contacted, three-
fourths of the public still believes that the space shuttle is a good investment for the U.S.
More people in February of 1986 were willing to endorse the program than five years
earlier. A substantial margin believed that the U.S. was spending a good amount of
money in the space program and 49o/o said they approved the level of the nation's space
expenditures, while 33%o statedthat too much is being spent and 1l% said too little was
being spent. Apparently the shuttle accident didn't damp Americans' eagerness to fly
into space themselves. Two out of five people said if they were offered the chance to fly
into space they would. Through the years, views on NASA though have shifted. Half of
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the public now say that the accent should be on scientific goals, while only a quarter
believe it should be on national defense. Since the Challenger accident some have
suggested a greater role for the military in recognition of the risks involved. $7)
Many comments have been made by people either in the field or politicians about
the NASA launch. Before Al Gore became Vice-president during the time of the accident
he was a senator and said, He, "was disturbed that the shuttle program continued, despite
warnings within NASA about the booster rockets' seals. 
oolt seems that some of the
memos inNASA files should have raised all kinds of red flags and set off warning bells,
and yet they didn't." (48) Roger Boisjoly made an opinion statement in September of
1987 with The Scientisl who used to be a Morton Thiokol engineer at the time of the
Challenger disaster and who had forewarned the company of potential O-ring problems.
He wrote about how all space flights involve risk, but it's the job of the people on the
ground level to assess the risk and minimize it. Boisjoly wrote on that, "The question
today is whether NASA and Morton Thiokol... have adequately re-examined their
approach to the issue of risk assessment." (49) His response to the situation was no. He
believes management must listen to technical data and recommendations objectively and
then make a decision based on the degree of risk versus the consequences, first to the
product user then to its employees. A quality control manager once told him to also ask
yourself the following questions when dealing with tough situations. "Would you allow
your wife or children to use this product without any reservations?" (50) If a no was
answered to this then it's a sign for others to not use.
Boisjoly's opinion gets stronger when he begins to discuss the management




philosophy when the position is reached. Self-protection or position become the
overriding concerns of all future decisions. He adds on, 
o'I'm afraid that since the
Challenger disaster, a business-as-usual attitude appears to prevail among management at
both Morton Thiokol and NASA. They have no reason to change management style
because there has been no accountability to date for wrongdoing. NASA has yet to
invoke the $10 million contract penalty against Morton Thiokol." (51)
The Challenger shlttle was agreattragedy on the crew members families, NASA,
and the American people. After researching the subject, it is easy to say that the choice of
the Challenger launch was truly a mistake made on part by money. It was important to
get the shuttle up because of a mere time space window, but honestly risking the lives of
seven people to make a time window is not a good enough reason. In an article by the
Review of Financial Economics they define catastrophic events as war or natural disasters
that capture widespread public attention, dread and fascination. The accident of the
Challenger was truly a catastrophic event.
An article in Review of Financial Economics explains how catastrophic events
and the stock market all relate the Challenger accident. Their definition of catastrophic
events is that the events place extreme stress on the stock market, analysts can be misled
by breaking news items that may be inaccurate, incomplete, or biased. During such
periods as this, there is a strong and persuasive perception of uncertainty regarding
affected securities. Contagion effects also can prevail after catastrophic events. This
occurred with the stock market after the Challenger accident. Many securities were
transferred to other securities either in the same or a related industry. Often this leads to
panic and investors will decide to liquidate their holdings until higher quality information
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becomes available. Investors almost believe the news, false or not, and will determine
their routes dependent on their sources.
The article in Review of Financial Economics also included information about
NASA awarding $6.40 billion dollars in contracts to twenty-three major contractors in
1985. Companies with revenues highly dependent upon NASA were the most affected by
a slow down in the space shuttle program or by a redirection of NASA priorities. After
the crash six of the seven major contractors had negative excess returns on the explosion
and of those six, four had significantly negative excess returns. Although, "day four and
five after the crash investors had good days mainly because of the news coverage." (52)
Fortune reported in May and June of 1985 Morton Thiokol's shares fell l6% to a
price of $42.00, which was fifteen times its estimated earnings of $2.80 for the 1985
fiscal year ending in June. From 1982-1987 Morton Thiokol had a growth of lTYoin
operating earnings and an l8olo return on equity. (53) Although with all the lawsuits
Morton Thiokol remained strong because the company does so many other businesses
which bring in half of its prophets. Morton Thiokol is the leader in packaging adhesives,
powder coatings, and chemicals used in electric circuitry, also the Morton Salt operation
continues to be successful with return assets in 1987 being 20%o. Amazingly enough
though, Morton Thiokol agreed with NASA to return $10 million in profits and to
redesign the solid-fuel boosters at cost price. Morton Thiokol's chief executive officer
Charles Locke was quoted saying; "This shuttle thing will cost us nearly 10 cents a
share." (54) New York Representative James Scheuer retumed a comment about Locke
by saying his remarks were grossly insensitive and eamed Mr. Locke a place in the
corporate "hall of infamy." (55) They have also agreed on performing $409 million in
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repair work at cost, which critics in Washington attacked that the penalties weren't stiff
enough. Representative Robert Toricelli replied with, "The company should be in a
position of mitigating its damages rather than just limiting its profits." (56)
The lawsuits for Morton Thiokol were predicted not to exceed $l-2 million a
piece that the government and Thiokol's insurers have reportedly paid to five of the
crewmember's families. The company was given a fine, suspended its work on current
contracts and bids for new ones in 1985 and 1986. For 1987 Morton Thiokol earned a
total of $86 million from the shuttle contract, only $7 million less than the company
anticipated before the disaster. Their share earnings also rose at least l6Yo to $3.30 in the
new fiscal year in 1986. By mid 1988 their stock price rose to $55.00 per share. (57)
After Challenger exploded, an analysis on the budget impact of correcting
possible causes of the accident, no cost could be estimated but an outline of corrective
steps could be done. A Wall Street Journal article from 1986 reported that top space
agency officials estimated the cost of replacing the shuttle Challenger at around $2.8
billion. (58) This included a figure of $350 million to complete the agency's
investigation of the Challenger. "To replace the orbiter and remedy any defects in other
shuttle systems, NASA needed an additional $500 million in fiscal year of 1986, $900
million in the fiscal year 1987, $900 million in fiscal year 1988 and $360 million in fiscal
year 1989." (59) The military (with their money) was to join in more throughout 1988
having fifteen of the twenty flights military missions.
NASA officials have decided to not renew certain agreements with private
customers to launch commercial satellites. The agreements are ones (throughout 1986)
that have expired or expire within the year. The move reflects a growing consensus
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within the interagency task force that, in the future, commercial satellites should be
launched by privately owned unmanned rockets, as well as by NASA space shuttles.
An investigation of primary and secondary sources about the Challenger lead to
many conclusions. A major finding was that without the Challenger being launched
many companies would lose money. Yet these companies lost money because of the
explosion. By seeing stock values of Morton Thiokol it is easy to see that they worried a
great deal and lost nothing compared to the lives lost in the explosion. Morton Thiokol
was so concemed about losing NASA before the accident, they kept their contract with
NASA even after the accident. Morton Thiokol was what I feel, slightly punished. A
fine for me isn't a big deal, especially when the fine was about 1% of what they make a
year. It is unfortunate that people lost their jobs, the people that made the wrongful
decision should have lost their jobs. Such executives as Gerald Mason, I feel should have
been fired because he ovemrled the request.
Communication plays a big role in this situation, and by making adjustments
within departments, there is hope that a situation like this won't happen again. After
much research it is good to see that NASA pulled together and took responsibility.
Sometimes a "rocking of the boat" opens up situations and people can really see what is
happening and make changes to protect those in risk of being hurt. NASA needs to relax
with the idea of a slight window for launching missions. Many circumstances appear
without prior knowledge. We can't control Mother Nature, if the weather turns bad, then
it does and those missions prepared to launch should wait. NASA should create a
flexibility window so they have longer time to launch, or they should build another
launching site so more missions can be carried out.
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There isn't much to be said of the Challenger, it was nothing anyone could
control, only few people could, and even they might not have known the results. As a
nation we can only hope and support the future of NASA in dreams that perhaps better ,
decisions will be made in part of the crew and the past NASA missions.
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